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Propaganda	Is	Now	Another	Name	for	Communication	Itself:	
Conversation	with	Metahaven	and	Suhail	Malik		
An	extensively	edited	and	revised	transcript	of	the	public	discussion	
between	Metahaven	and	Suhail	Malik	held	on	October	29,	2016	during	
Metahaven’s	Information	Skies	solo	exhibition	at	AutoItalia,	London.	
The	US	presidential	election	was	to	be	held	10	days	later	on	November	
8.	
Suhail	Malik:	I’d	like	to	address	some	of	the	themes	that	seem	to	have	preoccupied	you	for	some	time,	and	not	just	in	the	content	of	your	work,	but	also	in	terms	of	how	your	work	operates.	I	am	particularly	interested	in	how	your	collaborative	practice—and	your	transdisciplinary	practice,	too,	as	artists,	designers,	writers,	and	editors—contributes	to	a	renewal	or	a	transformation	of	our	understanding	of	propaganda.	One	of	the	most	striking	concerns	evident	over	the	course	of	your	practice	is	that	the	status	of	propaganda	has	recently	changed.	Could	you	explain	how	and	why	propaganda	became	a	theme	for	you?	
Metahaven:	We	initially	viewed	propaganda	as	something	quaint,	a	dusty	relic	that,	at	least	in	the	West,	appeared	to	have	“ended”	after	the	Cold	War,	and	was	supplanted	by	also-deceptive	soft	power.	In	this	period,	military	power	is	wielded	multi-laterally	though	an	increasingly	dysfunctional	system	of	collaborative	agreements,	among	which	is	the	“coalition	of	the	willing”	that	okays	the	Iraq	invasion	in	2003.	At	or	about	the	same	time,	cloud	platforms	begin	to	emerge,	simultaneous	also	to	growing	rifts	and	ruptures	within	the	liberal	West—mainly	focused	on	immigration	and	religion—and	between	the	West	and	other	parts	of	the	world.	Our	current	work	develops	from	an	awareness	of	the	ways	in	which	the	moving	image	is	taking	a	critical	role	in	the	reemergence	of	propaganda,	in	particular	between	Russia	and	the	West.	 	
SM:	How	is	your	more	recent	interest	in	propaganda	connected	to	your	pre-2010	work	on	state	branding	and	the	commodification	of	identity	and	status?		
  
MH: States in the post-1989 era were presumed to become market actors, 
having left behind a competition for political hegemony. Soft power is 
then simply the brand image of an actor in this marketplace—which is 
not just economical, but also one of ideas. The idea of soft power, like 
propaganda, is premised on telling stories. In convergence with a 
planetary “cloud,” the means to tell stories proliferate and become more 
evenly distributed. Propaganda emerges as the former marketplace of 
ideas is transformed into an increasingly unregulated arena of free 
speech, where it is possible to achieve remarkable results even when 
holding comparatively little actual power, aided by the scaling and 
network effects of the platform itself. From pseudo-television to hacking, 
this proliferation of the means to tell stories and advance interests through 
the computational “megastructure” has been paired with a decreasing 
focus on democracy and rule of law as foundations for legitimacy. These 
principles are being taken for granted, or gradually replaced by more 
base-level ideas of “effectiveness.” It’s not an accident so much as a 
design feature of this new model of power that during the July 2016 so-
called coup d’état, Turkish president Recep Erdoğan addresses the nation 
via Apple FaceTime.  
 The assumption that digital platforms would somehow be naturally 
inscribed with liberal values and would thus inherently serve as 
instruments of soft power—for example, for the US and its allies—led the 
US to enter the 2010 cycle of revolutionary events in North Africa and 
the Middle East. The idea was that Twitter and other platforms would 
provide the additional soft power that would give these events a certain 
political signature, while in fact, the era of soft power lay just behind us. 
 
SM:	This	became	explicit	when	Egyptian	authorities	blocked	the	use	of	Twitter	in	Tahrir	Square	during	the	Arab	Spring	because	the	platform	was	said	to	be	the	main	organizing	medium	there.	It	then	became	clear	that	the	US	state	was	heavily	backing	Twitter	and	putting	pressure	on	the	Egyptian	authorities	to	keep	it	open;	the	Egyptian	state	ultimately	complied.		
MH:	Many	media	stories	claim	that	this	or	that	revolution	or	uprising	started	“with	my	Facebook	post,”	a	myth,	a	standard	techno-determinist	narrative,	framed	to	benefit	the	role	of	the	West.	In	
Uncorporate	Identity,	we	addressed	the	unpairing	of	political	
  
outcomes	from	their	standards	of	communication,	as	is	exemplified	by	the	hypothetical	case	in	which	the	United	States	has	vanished	from	the	earth,	but	everybody	keeps	on	speaking	English.	
SM:	But	cloud	platforms	have	also	become	actors	themselves.	
MH:	YouTube	was	created	in	2005	and	bought	by	Google	in	2006.	Russia	Today	also	started	in	2005.	There	are	a	whole	bunch	of	influential	platforms	that	were	founded	in	the	mid-2000s	and	became	more	visible	later	on.		
SM:	I	want	to	come	back	to	the	“it	all	started	with	my	Facebook	post”	meme.	What’s	quite	telling	about	that	claim	is	the	way	in	which	an	individual	actor	can	have	systemic	effects.	Before	the	internet	you	needed	to	go	through	mediating	institutions	to	amplify	your	claims	or	criticisms.	The	“it	all	started	with	my	Facebook	post”	myth	speaks	to	how	small	actors	can	now	have	large	effects,	and	to	how	large-scale	actors	don’t	necessarily	have	large	effects.	There’s	a	kind	of	scrambling	of	scales	between	announcements	and	actions	or	effects	going	on.		  	 The	usual	verification	processes	break	down,	so	any	transmission	is	at	once	the	signal,	the	content,	and	also	propaganda	somehow.	It’s	not	clear	what	counts	as	content,	what	counts	as	affect,	and	what	counts	as	persuasion.	What	seems	to	be	at	the	core	of	The	
Sprawl	is	the	feeling	that	propaganda	has	become	another	name	for	communication	itself. 
	 If	so,	the	modern	and	critical	view	of	propaganda	as	distinct	from	truth,	as	a	kind	of	deception	that	undercuts	truth,	or	as	a	form	of	communication	that’s	dictated	only	by	power,	doesn’t	hold	for	network-based	communication	anymore.	Instead,	you	cannot	tell	whether	communication	conveys	power	or	a	truth—whether	it’s	subjective	truth,	or	epistemological	truth,	and	so	on.	
MH:	Maybe.	
SM:	However,	one	faction	of	the	critical	Left,	and	also	of	liberalism	for	that	matter,	certainly	held	on	to	this	distinction.	There	was	a	clear	sense	from	the	Enlightenment	onward	that	propaganda	was	to	be	treated	with	suspicion—that,	at	least	in	principle,	it	should	be	
  
possible	to	demarcate	a	rational	claim	from	propagandistic	claims.	That’s	the	critical	task.	Rationalists	argued	for	the	elimination	of	propaganda	as	a	basis	for	action.	We	can	also	see	this	conveyed	in	now	prevalent	notions	of	the	market	as	a	kind	of	rational	mechanism:	“the	market	says,”	“the	market	dictates,”	and	so	on.	The	market	is	held	to	be	a	kind	of	enacted	knowledge,	which	isn’t	determined	by	propaganda.	In	effect,	it’s	considered	a	systemic	process	for	producing	rational	social	truths.	Politics,	on	the	other	hand,	is	considered	the	domain	of	propaganda—full	of	interests	and	distortions	of	the	otherwise	neutral	informational	operation	of	market	pricing.	But	this	perspective	seems	to	assume	that	information	is	rationally	communicative	and	not	propaganda.	 Are	you	saying	that	this	distinction	was	always	untenable?		
MH:	Let	us	explain.	When	you	say	that	scientific	knowledge	has	to	some	degree	shattered	our	older	belief	systems,	and	that	we	now	exist	on	a	kind	of	ground	zero	where	we	understand	truth	scientifically…	
SM:	That’s	the	Enlightenment	claim.		
MH:	Then	we’ve	also	been	disenchanted	on	a	cosmic	scale.	Peter	Sloterdijk	writes	about	the	“celestial	domes”	that	once	seemed	to	hold	our	lives	together,	and	asks:	how	do	we	keep	on	living	now	that	these	protective	domes	are	shattered	and	now	that	we	are	naked	under	indifferent	heavens?	Sloterdijk	claims	that	all	human	life	has	always	only	been	possible	within	a	bubble.	In	spite	and	precisely	because	of	our	cosmic	disenchantment,	we	create	bubbles	for	ourselves	in	which	we	temporarily,	artificially	restore	the	possibility	of	belief.	And	then	our	theory,	which	is	not	really	a	theory	at	all,	is	actually	that	propaganda	bubbles,	as	pop-ups	for	alternative	truths,	say,	“this	may	or	may	not	be	true,	but	let’s	act	as	if	it	is.”	It	becomes	a	matter	of	version	against	version.	The	truth	is	decided	on	by	the	rendering	speed	of	one	bubble	versus	that	of	the	other	bubble.	The	most	effectively,	all-encompassingly	rendered	bubble	thus	produces	a	new	fact.	Both	the	averted	coup	in	Turkey	and	the	Brexit	campaign	in	the	UK	followed	this	logic.	 	 The	main	point	of	this	bubble	theory	of	truth	is	that	a	fictional	
  
opponent	is	much	stronger	than	a	real	opponent.	Via	platform-induced	hypnosis,	citizens	got	the	idea	that	their	Brexit	vote	made	them	into	patriotic	heroes	saving	the	National	Health	Service,	or	that	they	would	be	casting	a	protest	vote	that	wouldn’t	matter	anyway,	or	doing	this	partially	in	virtual	reality	fantasyland.	Because	on	the	other	side	were	the	“all-powerful	liberals”…		
SM:	People	like	us.		
MH:	Yeah,	the	people	who	also	didn’t	see	it	coming.		
SM:	Trump	is	another	obvious	example	of	this:	there’s	a	massive	scaling	from	the	individual	contributions	to	Facebook,	people	living	within	their	own	filter	bubble,	which	is	perhaps	another	version	of	the	bubble	that	Sloterdijk	is	talking	about.	Eli	Pariser	talks	about	how	filter	bubbles	shatter	social	cohesion.	 	 But	why	is	this	considered	such	a	big	problem?	It’s	worth	asking	that	question,	not	to	throw	the	expectation	of	social	cohesion	under	the	bus	but	rather	to	better	understand	what	it	actually	means.	Its	corrosion	is	only	a	problem	if	you	hold	onto	an	Enlightenment	version	of	civil	society	as	a	place	of	competing	public	interests	that	ultimately	produce	a	perspective	close	to	rational	truth,	through	some	kind	of	deliberative	democracy.	By	contrast,	the	cloud-based	bubbles	you	mention	are	specific,	technically	organized	enactments	of	what	in	the	late	1970s	Jean-François	Lyotard	described	as	the	breakdown	of	the	metanarratives	of	modernity	through	information	processes.	For	Lyotard,	the	grand	narratives	of	the	Enlightenment—notably,	emancipation	through	knowledge,	or	rather	emancipation	
and	knowledge	as	producers	of	the	“good”	society—break	down	because	they	lose	legitimacy	through	the	horizontal	distribution	of	information	in	network	societies.	This	results	in	numerous	different	narratives,	each	coherent	as	a	self-contained	bubble	that	spread	subjective	opinions	that	only	reinforce	themselves.	This	happens	because	the	material	condition	of	the	network	doesn’t	require	any	reference	to	a	greater,	socially	organizing	narrative	as	a	basic	normative	constraint.	 	 What’s	key	in	this	transformation	of	the	social	bond	is	that	subjectification	becomes	the	condition	for	truth.	The	bubble	refers	to	
  
subjects	who	live	within	a	certain	interpretation	of	truth	due	to	the	information	they’re	getting,	but	also	how	it	feels	to	be	inside	that	self-reinforcement.	It’s	what	Stephen	Colbert	in	2005	called	“truthiness”:	you	don’t	necessarily	know	what	the	truth	is,	but	that	it	just	feels	right.	It’s	truth	from	the	gut,	not	from	the	head,	which	is	to	say	truth	without	an	epistemological	foundation.	What	Colbert	presented	as	satire	at	that	time	is	what	Trump	now	does	in	earnest.	It’s	the	basic	condition	for	what’s	called	a	post-truth	or	post-fact	politics,	which	has	been	reinforced	by	social	bubbling. 	 To	come	back	to	your	practice	more	directly:	it	seems	to	me	that	the	key	issue	that	your	work	deals	with—made	explicit	in	The	
Sprawl—is	that	this	move	toward	a	post-truth	or	post-fact	condition	
requires	propaganda	as	the	only	viable	mode	of	political	communication,	if	not	of	social	composition	altogether.		
MH:	Yes.	And	at	the	same	time,	The	Sprawl	is	about	being	inside.	It’s	much	more	as	if	you’re	in	flight	mode	inside	propaganda.	This	also	allows	you	to	discern	different	qualities	of	truth-making	in	propaganda	that	can	be	more,	or	less,	elegant.	So,	when	you’re	talking	about	Trump’s	truth-making—Trump-making—it	is	the	crudest	form	of	truth-making	(or	lie-making)	possible.	It’s	the	low-res	of	post-truth.	
SM:	What’s	important	about	refinement	though?	Isn’t	that	a	way	of	maintaining	a	critical	distance,	which	is	more	typical	of	a	skeptical	position	that	looks	for	truth	behind	the	propaganda?	Also,	though	I	think	I	disagree	with	your	version	of	what	Trump	is,	why	is	he	(or,	as	a	propagandistic	phenomenon,	it)	at	low	resolution?	
MH:	The	issue	with	propaganda	and	bubble-making	is	not	just	about	
what	the	bubble	is,	but	also	how	it	is.	So,	the	treatment,	let’s	say,	of	a	certain	proposition,	is	of	vital	importance	
SM:	Are	you	then	like	connoisseurs?	
MH:	Hobbyists,	rather!	It’s	not	that	once	there	were	facts	and	now	there	are	only	post-facts.	The	idea	that	we	have	entered	a	fundamentally	new	era	is	tempting	to	believe	in,	but	it’s	a	techno-determinist	idea.	If	you	look	at	newspapers	in	the	1950s	that	stood	
  
for	a	certain	party	line,	you	would	recognize	the	same	bubbles.	We	also	don’t	believe	that	the	only	alternatives	to	“post-facts”	are	“facts.”			
SM:	No,	but	the	key	difference	would	be	that	you	have	diverse	opinions	represented	in	various	media,	which	are	supposed	to	lead	to	a	kind	of	consensus	through	deliberative	democracy.	By	contrast,	the	problem	you’re	describing	is	one	in	which	the	whole	field	of	discourse	is	now	made	up	of	a	divergent	views	without	a	consensual	meeting	point.		
MH:	Right,	and	one	of	the	problems	with	“post-facts”	so	far	has	been	that	in	order	to	refute	them,	one	first	needs	to	repeat	them.	That	reiteration	of	the	untruth	is	part	of	the	post-truth	condition.	Hillary	Clinton	tried	to	get	around	this	by	asking	people	to	“go	to	hillaryclinton.com	to	check	if	what	Donald	just	said	is	true.”1	
SM:	Essentially,	political	discourse	has	become	clickbait.	I	read	something	around	the	beginning	of	the	Trump	candidacy	on	this	subject.	Basically,	Trump	began	his	presidential	bid	as	a	promotional	campaign	for	himself	as	a	brand.	His	strategy	was	to	“suck	all	the	oxygen	out	of	the	room”:	he	says	things	that	will	immediately	become	the	talking	points	so	that	attention	always	goes	to	him	and	on	his	terms.	Everything	he	says	is	simply	meant	to	generate	a	reaction,	which	serves	to	propagate	his	brand.	 	 It	has	been	interesting	to	see	this	strategy	become	power,	because	what’s	key	is	that	the	content	of	what	he	says	is	entirely	subordinated	to	his	mediatized	presence.	Content	becomes	a	mechanism	of	“likes”	(however	much	one	may	dislike	what	he	says).	The	question	then	concerns	what	the	basis	for	communication	becomes.	If	the	common	space	of	discourse—which	in	the	modern	period	was	called	rationalism	or	community—is	now	weak	or	subordinated	to	these	affective,	rhetorical,	persuasive	power	claims,	which	are	the	domain	of	propaganda,	what	is	happening	to	communication	in	general?	
                                                
1 “Clinton brought up the website early in the debate, asking viewers to go to the 
website to follow along during the debate. She also called on "the fact checkers" 
several times during the debate.” See https://mashable.com/2016/09/26/clinton-
website-fact-checker/ 
  
MH:	The	strategy	is	to	disrupt,	contradict,	to	make	no	sense,	and	produce	information	that	spontaneously	combusts.	
SM:	Could	you	say	a	little	more	about	the	high-definition	version	of	this	kind	of	disinformation?	What	do	you	find	is	more	sophisticated	about	it?	
MH:	Pre-Trump,	one	Russian	argument	has	been	that	no	news	platform	can	be	objective.	The	claim	was	constructed	as	follows:	every	large	mainstream	broadcaster	has	ties	with	their	national	government’s	policy,	the	BBC	and	CNN	as	much	as	Russia	Today	(RT).	The	claim	that	you	actually	can	exist	in	an	objective	space	outside	the	influence	of	geopolitics	is	never	really	true.	Based	on	this	idea,	RT	has	entitled	itself	to	have	their	platform	create	not	so	much	a	single	“national”	story,	but	lots	of	possibilities,	questions,	and	alternative	theories	around	events	reported	in	the	news.	By	opening	up	a	Pandora’s	box	of	possible,	alternative	hypotheses,	RT	catalyzes	epistemic	uncertainty;	it	does	not	offer	a	single	counter-narrative,	but	different	versions.	 	 The	production	of	this	kind	of	disinformation	also	often	involves	creating	forms	of	analog,	offline	parallel	constructions.	The	Russian	manufacturer	of	the	missile	that	took	down	Malaysia	Airlines	Flight	17	in	2014,	created	a	Vladimir	Tatlin-like	experimental	installation	of	one	such	missile,	mounted	on	a	wooden,	constructivist	structure.	They	then	positioned	a	discarded	plane	fuselage	next	to	it.	They	exploded	the	missile	to	demonstrate	that	actually	this	could	not	have	been	the	weapon	that	downed	MH17.	They	made	a	video	of	it	that	was	subsequently	released	online.	The	degree	of	investment	in	creating	this	story	is	absurdly	deep.	It	is	an	entire	parallel	reality,	not	just	a	few	incoherent	lines.		
SM:	For	the	sake	of	clarification,	and	because	we’re	talking	now	about	Russia,	let’s	compare	this	propagandistic	method	to	that	of	the	Soviet	Communist	period.	Pravda,	which	translates	to	“truth,”	was	the	newspaper	for	the	Communist	Party’s	propaganda.	The	paper	and	everything	in	it	were	clearly	understood	as	communist	propaganda.	So,	there	was	a	kind	of	enactment	of	clear	political	authority.		
  
MH:	An	official	version.	
SM:	Yeah,	but	it’s	clearly	not	the	truth,	and	that	was	probably	well	understood	by	a	good	proportion	of	its	readership.	But	it	was	one	message,	and	you	had	to	accept	it	even	if	you	didn’t	believe	it.	But	following	what	you’ve	just	said,	propaganda	today	is	completely	different.	It	produces	a	multiplicity	of	narratives,	each	of	which	could	be	true,	but	the	net	effect	of	which	is	to	discredit	any	official	narrative	from	any	side.	Is	the	strategic	aim	just	to	get	rid	of	the	viability	of	a	credible	truth	claim?	
MH:	The	Russian	language	has	two	words	for	truth.	Not	just	pravda,	but	also	istina,	a	higher	spiritual	truth	that	can’t	be	grasped	in	the	everyday.	But	the	situation	isn’t	particularly	Russian.	In	general,	in	a	fuzzy	landscape	where	nobody	knows	what’s	real,	and	everyone	gets	to	have	their	freedom	of	speech	and	their	opinions	without	adhering	to	the	meeting	point	of	the	real,	power	goes	unchallenged	and	becomes	medieval.		Did	you	see	the	citation	from	Leo	Tolstoy’s	“What	Is	Art?”	in	The	
Sprawl?	Were	you	not,	like	us,	thoroughly	fulfilled	by	this	citation?	
SM:		Absolutely	not.		
MH:	Tolstoy	is	saying	that	in	order	to	make	us	experience	a	wolf,	there	needn’t	be	a	wolf.	It	could	have	been	invented.	Isn’t	that	a	simple	way	to	address	an	element	of	post-truth	that	goes	missing	in	the	discussion?	Are	we	losing	our	ability	to	cope	with	fiction,	and	is	this	becoming	exploited	by	political	actors	who	use	our	fading	fiction-literacy	for	their	own	gains?	Besides,	Tolstoy—who	asserted	that	art	should	never	be	used	in	service	of	any	power—returns	to	the	emotional	truth	of	a	shared	narration.		
SM:	I	guess.	It	makes	sense	to	me	in	its	own	terms,	but	it’s	an	expressionistic	and	representational	notion	of	art.	When	Tolstoy	says	a	successful	work	of	art	is	an	individual	expressing	something	that	the	recipient	understands	and	feels,	then	there	is	perhaps	a	kind	of	truth.	But	it’s	an	affective	truth,	set	into	a	subjective	basis	as	a	unique	experience.	However,	in	the	conditions	you	have	been	describing,	it’s	
  
important	that	there	are	many	bubbles,	not	just	the	extension	of	the	artist’s	bubble	to	another	person.	And	it’s	the	aggregate	effect	of	this	production	of	multiple,	unique	subjective	truths	that	I’m	interested	in.	 	 It	seems	to	me	that	what	you’ve	identified	in	the	idea	of	propaganda	is	the	net	consequence	of	all	these	strategic	and	corporatized	notions	of	art.	The	consequences	of	which	are	very	different	from	what	Tolstoy	is	describing,	as	much	as	his	account—if	you	are	into	it,	which	I	am	not—may	be	a	good	description	of	what	art	should	do	on	the	micro-level	of	subjective	experience.	You	could	say	that	such	an	aggregate-level	effect	is	a	consequence	of	postmodernity	as	Lyotard	described	and	theorized	it—there	are	only	small	narratives	without	any	calibrating	grand	narrative—as	it	is	the	realization	of	now	fairly	ingrained	poststructuralist	claims	that	all	so-called	truths	are	power	claims.	And	that	feeds	into	the	assumptions	you’d	expect	for	critical	art	practice:	skepticism	toward	power	and	toward	anything	that	claims	to	be	the	truth,	because	art	is	supposed	to	stand	for	something	else.	 	 So	what	interests	me	in	your	position	regarding	art	is	that	somehow	your	work	on	propaganda	addresses	what	certain	state	or	state-corporate	actors	are	now	doing	as	large-scale	network	operators,	as	a	kind	of	instrumentalized	postmodern,	poststructuralist	avant-garde.	What	you’re	dealing	with	is	how,	in	a	sense,	state-level	organizations	have	caught	up	with	the	things	that	have	been	happening	in	art	for	some	thirty	to	forty	years	now:	the	dismissal	of	the	grand	narrative,	the	primacy	of	the	subjective	position	that	this	multiplicity	of	positions	all	have	equal	validity	and	so	on.	All	you’re	left	with	here	is	a	series	of	alternatives	without	a	unifying	horizon	or	a	gathering	narrative.	 	 The	problem	then	for	contemporary	art,	or	at	least	for	art	that	makes	critical	claims,	is	that	it	sets	itself	up	to	be	counter-statist,	counter-hegemonic,	anti-capitalist,	and	so	on.	But	the	dominant	powers,	perhaps	most	clearly	exemplified	by	Russia,	are	now	replicating	or	duplicating	exactly	what	critical	art	practices	have	been	doing	for	some	time.	If	we	still	want	to	maintain	a	critical	position	via	the	received	precepts	of	contemporary	art,	this	is	a	crisis.	We	can	no	longer	maintain	any	distance	or	separation	from	a	
  
powerful	actor	“over	there.”	 	 But	I	wonder	if	your	ambivalent	position	on	our	mini-narratives	versus	the	untruths	of	big	power	takes	a	stance	other	than	the	paralyzing	dilemma	contemporary	art	now	faces.	Do	you	see	some	potential	in	the	fact	that	there	is	a	convergence	between	the	way	that	art	and	the	state	operate,	and	that	you’re	exactly	at	the	intersection	point	between	those	two	things?	I’m	wondering	whether	that	feels	like	an	opportunity	or	a	curse,	because	it	seems	to	me	you	nonetheless	want	to	remain	skeptical	of	the	state.		
MH:	We	see	many	limits	to	rendering	everything	through	a	geopolitical	lens,	and	in	fact	we	also	really	need	to	expand	the	way	that	we	tell	stories,	the	way	we	work,	and	the	way	that	we	translate	things	that	we	feel	into	things	that	other	people	then	can	also	feel.		
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